Saving Humanity from Hell at UN Headquarters
The title of Chapter 38 comes from a quote by Dag Hammarskjold, the legendary UN Secretary-General: the UN exists “to save humanity from hell.” Chew Beng Yong spent 26 years inside the UN Secretariat trying to do exactly that.
This is part of my retelling of “50 Years of Singapore and the United Nations” (Tommy Koh, Li Lin Chang, Joanna Koh, 2015, ISBN: 978-9814713030).
This chapter is a personal reflection by Chew Beng Yong, a Singaporean woman who worked at the UN from 1980 to 2006. Before that, she served at Singapore’s Permanent Mission to the UN from 1975 to 1979. And before that, she was in Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1969. That is nearly four decades of diplomacy and international affairs. This is someone who saw the inside of the UN machine from up close, through some of the most turbulent decades in modern history.
The Cold War Years: A Paralyzed UN
Chew’s career at the UN started in the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs. During the early 1980s, the UN was practically paralyzed. The Permanent Members of the Security Council, especially the US and Soviet Union, kept vetoing each other’s proposals. Nothing got done.
The real action was in the General Assembly, where the non-aligned states and the Group of 77 had enough votes to pass whatever resolutions they wanted. But General Assembly resolutions are not binding. So things moved, but slowly and without real teeth.
It was only when the Cold War ended that the Security Council started working properly. Agreements were reached. Proxy wars in Latin America, Africa, and elsewhere finally came to an end. The number of peacekeeping operations grew rapidly. New types of missions appeared: peace-making, peace-building, and political missions.
Cambodia and East Timor
In Southeast Asia, the intensive work of the five original ASEAN countries, together with UN officials, paved the way for the signing of the Comprehensive Agreements on Cambodia in 1991. That ended one of the region’s longest conflicts.
East Timor took much longer. The Security Council had called on all states to respect East Timor’s right to self-determination back in 1975. But it was not until 1999 that Indonesia and Portugal agreed to let the UN conduct a referendum there.
Chew played a direct role in the East Timor story. She led the first interdepartmental needs assessment to East Timor. She also headed the political affairs unit of UNAMET, the UN mission that organized the referendum. She describes this as an unforgettable experience.
A Career Across Crises
Chew’s list of assignments reads like a tour through the major geopolitical events of the late twentieth century.
She planned, organized, and coordinated the entire UN system’s participation in activities for the 1986 International Year of Peace. She assisted in implementing the Secretary-General’s good offices role in Myanmar and on the Korean peninsula. She worked closely through the UN Political Office in Bougainville to help bring an end to a ten-year conflict between the Bougainvilleans and the government of Papua New Guinea, with a peace agreement signed on August 30, 2001.
On the disarmament side, she served as Special Assistant to the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs. She supported the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, based in Kathmandu, Nepal.
One particularly interesting assignment was in the early 1980s, when she served as secretary to a group of experts studying the consequences of Israel’s 1981 attack on Iraqi nuclear installations. Both the Security Council and the General Assembly had condemned that attack. The next attack aimed at destroying Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction came in March 2003, with the full invasion of Iraq.
The Iraq War and Its Consequences
Chew writes with clear feeling about the 2003 Iraq invasion. She calls it a “unilateral military action against a Member State, without authorisation.” She notes it has serious implications for the Security Council, the UN body charged with maintaining international peace and security.
Five months after the invasion, the UN headquarters in Baghdad was bombed. Twenty-two people were killed, including the Secretary-General’s Special Representative. Chew writes that they were “terribly shocked and saddened.”
She goes further in her analysis. The disastrous consequences of the Iraq invasion were still unfolding at the time of writing. The “global war on terror” had led to a growing threat of non-state actors seeking weapons of mass destruction for nuclear terrorism. Any conflict involving nuclear weapons, she writes, would be catastrophic for humanity.
She asks a pointed question: is it unreasonable to insist that the Permanent Members of the Security Council begin implementing Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which requires nuclear disarmament? The treaty was already 35 years old when she wrote this. The big powers signed it but never fully followed through on their own disarmament obligations.
Defending the UN
Chew is not naive about the UN’s failures. She acknowledges that the UN is often used as a “convenient whipping-boy” by member states. She admits that many criticisms of its shortcomings, double standards, and failures in Kosovo, Bosnia, Rwanda, and elsewhere are justified.
But she adds important context. Some factors are beyond the Secretariat’s control. Parties reject parts of agreements. Resources are inadequate. Time frames for implementing complex mandates are unrealistic. The UN gets blamed for failures that are really caused by member states not giving it the tools to succeed.
Despite all that, she argues the UN has done a fairly impressive job over seven decades. It has worked to “promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,” as the UN Charter promises. She thinks we should be fair when judging it.
Why the UN Still Matters
Chew makes the case for why the UN remains essential. We live in a globalized, digitized world. Billions of dollars move in seconds. Pandemics, natural disasters, and man-made disasters can affect safety and security overnight. Collective action is the only way to address these threats.
She highlights the principle of sovereign equality of member states as especially valuable for smaller and less powerful countries. Along with respect for territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs, these principles protect small countries from being pushed around by bigger ones.
Singapore, she says, has played an active and constructive role in bridging differences among diverse groups of developing and small island states. This role is widely appreciated.
Building consensus among 193 member states is slow and painful work. But the legitimacy of decisions reached by consensus makes compliance more likely than decisions pushed through by powerful states or rubber-stamped by majority voting. The international laws and norms that emerge from this process are essential for a stable environment.
Singapore and the UN: A Mature Relationship
Chew ends by reflecting on how Singapore’s relations with the UN have broadened and deepened over the years. Singapore is regarded as a reliable and responsible partner. Its track record of paying membership dues on time and in full is exemplary. Not every country can say that.
Singapore’s participation in movements like the 3G (Global Governance Group) shows its commitment to enabling the UN to fulfill its mission. It is in Singapore’s interest, and in the interest of all member states.
My Take
This chapter is different from the others in this section of the book. The previous two chapters were institutional accounts from the SAF and the police force. This one is deeply personal. Chew Beng Yong gives us an insider’s view of the UN from someone who spent a career there.
What strikes me most is the range. Cambodia. East Timor. Myanmar. The Korean peninsula. Bougainville. Iraq. Disarmament. The International Year of Peace. This is one person’s career, and it touches nearly every major crisis of the late twentieth century.
Her defense of the UN is nuanced and honest. She does not pretend it is perfect. She acknowledges the failures. But she makes a strong case that the UN gets blamed for problems that are really caused by member states who do not provide enough resources or realistic mandates.
The question about nuclear disarmament is sharp. The big powers signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty decades ago promising to disarm. They never did. Chew asks why it is unreasonable to hold them to their own commitments. It is a fair question that still has no good answer.
Chew Beng Yong joined Singapore’s foreign service in 1969. She served at the UN for 26 years. She saw the Cold War paralysis, the post-Cold War expansion of peacekeeping, the Iraq disaster, and everything in between. Her perspective is valuable precisely because it comes from inside the system, from someone who dedicated her career to making it work.
About the Author
Chew Beng Yong joined the United Nations in March 1980 as a Political Affairs Officer. She served in various capacities including Special Assistant to the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs (1988-1992) and Deputy Director of the Asia and the Pacific Division of the Department of Political Affairs (1996-2006). Before joining the UN, she served in Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1969 to 1980, including a posting at Singapore’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations (1975-1979). She holds a BA (Hons) from the University of Singapore and an MA from New York University.
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