Singapore's Role in Global Trade Negotiations
When you think of global trade talks, you probably picture big countries throwing their weight around. The US, EU, China. But one of the most effective players in world trade negotiations is a tiny city-state with no natural resources.
This is part of my retelling of “50 Years of Singapore and the United Nations” (Tommy Koh, Li Lin Chang, Joanna Koh, 2015, ISBN: 978-9814713030).
Chapter 9 is written by See Chak Mun, a career diplomat who served twice as Singapore’s Ambassador to the GATT/WTO in Geneva. First from 1986 to 1991, then from 1997 to 2001. The man was there for two of the biggest moments in modern trade history: the Uruguay Round and the launch of the Doha Round.
Why Does Anyone Listen to Singapore on Trade?
This is the first thing See Chak Mun addresses. And the answer is not what you might expect.
Yes, Singapore punches above its weight in trade. By 2012, it was in the top 15 countries for goods trade and in the top 9 for services. That’s impressive for a country smaller than most cities. But that’s not really why Singapore gets a seat at the table.
The real reason is Singapore’s reputation as an honest broker. When big countries are stuck in a deadlock, they need someone who can talk to both sides without an obvious agenda. Singapore fills that role. It works with a group of “middle-grounders” and uses skilled diplomats to find solutions to problems that seem impossible.
It’s the same formula Singapore used at the UN Conference on the Law of the Seas and other major international events. Show up prepared, stay neutral, help people find a deal.
Singapore’s Track Record at the WTO
Singapore’s diplomats have been picked to chair all sorts of important committees and panels at the GATT and WTO. Things like dispute settlement panels on US lamb meat imports (complaint by Australia and New Zealand) and EU sardine labeling (complaint by Peru). Not exactly headline-grabbing stuff, but these cases matter a lot to the countries involved.
Singapore also hosted and chaired the very first WTO Ministerial Conference in 1996. That’s a big deal. It means the whole world trusted Singapore to run the show.
One particularly important role was chairing the Council on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). This led to a declaration in 2003 that made it easier for developing countries to import cheap generic drugs. Think about that. Countries dealing with HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria got access to affordable medicine partly because of work done under Singapore’s leadership.
The Doha Round: Where Things Got Really Interesting
The Doha Ministerial Conference in November 2001 is the centerpiece of this chapter. And the story is wild.
First, the timing. This was just two months after 9/11. The world was on edge. The US was figuring out its response. And the conference was supposed to happen in Qatar, a Middle Eastern country. The Americans actually raised security concerns at an informal meeting held in Singapore in October 2001. It got so serious that Singapore was asked to prepare backup conference facilities in case Doha was scrapped as a venue.
Qatar managed to convince the US that security would be fine. The backup plan was called off. But it gives you an idea of how tense everything was.
Then there was the NGO problem. At the previous conference in Seattle, activists and 20,000 American steel workers nearly shut the whole thing down. Qatar’s solution? Keep most of the NGOs out or put them far from the venue. Problem solved, at least logistically.
But the real challenges were the trade issues themselves.
Three Problems That Almost Killed the Doha Round
Problem 1: Agriculture
This was the big one. The EU was handing out export subsidies to its farmers, and exporting countries like Australia, Argentina, and Brazil wanted those subsidies gone. The phrase on the table was “reductions, with a view of phasing out, all forms of export subsidies.” Sounds reasonable, right?
Not to the French. They had a presidential election coming up. No French politician was going to tell their farmers the subsidies were ending. The rest of the EU farmers felt the same way.
Enter George Yeo, Singapore’s Trade and Industry Minister. He was the designated facilitator for the agriculture issue. And he managed to get everyone to agree by inserting one key phrase: “without prejudging the outcome of the negotiations.”
Sounds like diplomatic fudge? Maybe. But it was enough for the EU to accept the language and enough for the agricultural exporters to feel the direction was set. That’s what good mediators do. They find words both sides can live with.
Problem 2: The “Singapore Issues”
These were four topics named after the 1996 Singapore Ministerial: investment rules, competition policy, transparency in government procurement, and trade facilitation. The EU wanted all four included in the new round. They saw it as a trade-off for making concessions on agriculture.
But developing countries were furious. They saw investment rules as a way for rich countries to protect their multinational corporations. India was especially opposed. India’s Trade Minister was ready to block the entire Doha Round over this issue.
Again, George Yeo stepped in. He got the Indian Trade Minister to agree to a compromise: postpone the decision on these four issues until the next Ministerial Conference in two years. This gave the EU the appearance that the issues were on track, while giving developing countries more time to push back. It wasn’t perfect, but it kept the whole thing from falling apart.
Problem 3: Bananas (Yes, Really)
This one almost sounds like a joke, but it nearly derailed everything.
The EU wanted a waiver from WTO rules so it could keep giving preferential treatment to exports from African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries under something called the Cotonou Agreement. Sounds like a good thing for poor countries, right?
But Central American countries like Ecuador, Colombia, and Honduras were upset. They grew bananas too, and this preferential deal was eating into their share of the EU banana market.
The EU asked Singapore’s Margaret Liang, Deputy Permanent Representative in Geneva, to chair the working group that would sort this out. The Americans helped calm down the Central American countries. But then two ASEAN countries, the Philippines and Thailand, raised their own objection over canned tuna.
Once again, George Yeo had to personally intervene at the last minute. The closing ceremony of the entire Doha conference was delayed by three and a half hours while Margaret Liang worked out the final details. Three and a half hours. The whole world was waiting.
If the waiver hadn’t been granted, the ACP countries would have walked out. And the entire Doha Round would have collapsed before it even started.
The Thank-You Letters
After it was all over, several ministers wrote to George Yeo to thank him. One letter stood out:
Your personal capacities as a facilitator are, as we already knew from Seattle, outstanding. Your willingness to listen to the views of all the players, your ability to hear not only what they were saying but what lay behind the words, and the manner in which you distilled what you learnt into a possible solution proved in my view to be the key element in reaching agreement on the agricultural part of the Declaration.
That’s a pretty strong compliment from a foreign minister. And it captures exactly what Singapore brings to these negotiations. Not economic muscle. Not threats. Just the ability to listen, understand what people actually need, and find words that let everyone move forward.
Why Singapore Cares So Much About Trade Rules
See Chak Mun is honest about this. Singapore plays the honest broker, but there’s self-interest too. Singapore’s entire economy depends on international trade. A strong, rules-based trading system is survival for them.
He shares a nice story about an ambassador from a small developing country who explained why his country joined the WTO. Three reasons: to be part of the mainstream, to justify economic reforms at home, and to be able to take on bigger neighbors through the dispute settlement system.
See Chak Mun adds a fourth reason the ambassador missed: the Most Favored Nation principle means small countries get to benefit from trade deals negotiated by the big players. You don’t have to be at the main table to eat from it.
That’s basically Singapore’s philosophy. Keep the multilateral system alive. Keep the rules fair. And make sure small countries have a voice.
What I Take Away From This Chapter
Trade negotiations sound boring. Let’s be honest. Agriculture subsidies, MFN waivers, intellectual property councils. It’s not the stuff of movies.
But the stakes are huge. These talks determine whether poor countries can get cheap medicine. Whether small farmers can sell their products abroad. Whether a tiny nation can challenge a giant at the WTO.
Singapore’s role in all this is impressive. They don’t have the military power of the US or the market size of the EU. But they have something maybe more useful: trust. When everyone is stuck, they call Singapore. And Singapore shows up with people who can actually fix things.
George Yeo’s work at Doha is a masterclass in mediation. Getting the EU and agricultural exporters to agree on language. Convincing India to step back from the edge. Solving the banana crisis at the eleventh hour. All of it done through listening, patience, and finding the right words.
For a country of a few million people, that’s a pretty remarkable impact on global trade.
About the Author
See Chak Mun was Senior Advisor to Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He joined the Foreign Ministry in 1966 and served as Singapore’s Ambassador to Australia, Germany, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Austria, Hong Kong, and India. He was Singapore’s Permanent Representative to the UN and the GATT/WTO in Geneva from 1986 to 1991 and again from 1997 to 2001. He also served as High Commissioner to India from 2002 to 2006. He has written extensively on the international trading system and ASEAN-India relations.
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