Chapter 2: Lee Kuan Yew and His Special Connection with China
Chapter 2 is all about one man: Lee Kuan Yew. Written by Zheng Yongnian and Lim Wen Xin, it makes a strong case that Singapore’s special relationship with China was built on Lee’s personal connections with five generations of Chinese leaders, from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping, and the fact that China genuinely wanted to learn from Singapore’s success.
Before Deng: The Cold War Days
Here’s the thing about early Singapore-China relations. They were complicated. During the Cold War, Mao’s China was promoting communism across Southeast Asia. Lee was fighting communist insurgents at home. China didn’t even recognize Singapore as a real country until the 1970s. Chinese media called Lee a “running dog of US and British imperialism.” Not a warm start.
But Lee was a strategic thinker. When Nixon started normalizing relations with China, Lee saw an opening. He predicted China would eventually open up and become powerful. A tiny city-state needed to get on good terms with this future giant early.
His first visit to China came in 1976. He met an ailing Mao and his successor Hua Guofeng. At the Great Hall of the People, Lee made a simple pitch: Singapore is not anti-China. A stronger China means a better balance of power, which is safer for everyone. The meetings didn’t produce anything concrete, but Lee had planted a seed. After coming back, he lifted travel restrictions so young Singaporeans could visit China.
One clever move: Singapore deliberately waited to be the last ASEAN country to establish formal relations with China. Lee didn’t want anyone suspecting that Singapore, with its Chinese-majority population, was too cozy with Beijing. Indonesia had to go first.
Deng Xiaoping and Lee Kuan Yew: The Friendship That Changed Everything
So here’s what happened. Deng Xiaoping visited Singapore in November 1978, right before China’s historic pivot to economic reform. What Deng saw blew his mind. A tiny island, no natural resources, that had built a prosperous modern society by attracting foreign investment and running things efficiently. One-party rule, free economy, mostly Chinese population. Sound familiar?
A few weeks after Deng’s visit, China’s People’s Daily changed its tone on Singapore completely. Suddenly Singapore was a “garden city worth studying.” That’s a big shift from “running dog of imperialism.”
The authors point out three things that made the Deng-Lee relationship work.
First, both were nation-builders with enormous willpower. They recognized that drive in each other.
Second, both were ruthlessly pragmatic. Lee engaged China because it served Singapore. Deng listened to Lee because his analysis of the world helped China.
Third, genuine mutual respect. Here’s a small detail from Lee’s memoir: Deng was a chain smoker who always had a spittoon next to him. But when he visited Singapore, he didn’t light up or spit once in Lee’s presence.
And Lee didn’t just flatter Deng. He told him hard truths. During that 1978 visit, Lee pointed out that China’s radio broadcasts calling on ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia to support Beijing were causing serious problems. ASEAN governments saw it as subversion. Deng listened, asked what Lee wanted him to do, and shortly after returning to China, the broadcasts stopped.
Lee later described Deng as “a five-footer but a giant among men” and “the most impressive international leader I have ever met.” High praise from someone who met pretty much every major world leader of the 20th century.
After Deng: Keeping Singapore Relevant
Singapore formally established diplomatic relations with China in 1990. During his famous Southern Tour in 1992, Deng said: “There is good social order in Singapore. They govern the place with discipline. We should draw from their experience, and do even better than them.”
That kicked off a wave of Chinese officials coming to Singapore to learn governance, urban planning, anti-corruption. By 2015, close to 50,000 Chinese officials had visited Singapore for study trips.
The biggest joint project was the Suzhou Industrial Park, launched in 1994 to replicate Singapore’s DNA in China. But it ran into trouble. Local Chinese officials created a competing park next door and undercut the Singapore project on costs. Lee’s response was classic Lee: instead of pretending everything was fine, he raised the issue publicly at the highest levels. He proposed swapping ownership so China had majority control, and even put the rival park’s CEO in charge. It worked.
When his own officers asked why teach China and risk being outdone, Lee answered: “This is a chance for us to get a foot in China at a time when they don’t know how to do it. They’ve got so many bright fellows… you can’t prevent them from coming to Singapore with a camcorder. So, we might as well do this for them.”
More joint projects followed: the Tianjin Eco-city in 2007, the Guangzhou Knowledge City, the Chengdu High-Tech Park. Each one connected Singapore and China at multiple levels of government.
The Singapore Model: Why China Cared
So why did Chinese leaders keep coming back to Singapore for ideas? Singapore proved you could have a prosperous, well-governed society without Western-style liberal democracy. One-party rule, free markets, rule of law, low corruption. That’s exactly what China’s Communist Party wanted to believe was possible.
Lee argued that Asian countries didn’t need to copy the Western model. He blended Confucian values like collectivism and family with Western concepts like rule of law and transparency. This “soft authoritarianism” resonated deeply with Chinese leaders.
When Lee died in 2015, People’s Daily highlighted four of his legacies China was following: social stability, smooth political transitions, clean government, and rule of law. Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign was basically Lee’s “netting big fish” approach at Chinese scale.
Bridge Builder: Between China and Taiwan, Between East and West
Lee played a quiet but important role in cross-strait relations. He helped arrange the 1993 Wang-Koo Summit in Singapore, the first high-level dialogue between mainland China and Taiwan. Singapore recognized “One China” but maintained practical ties with Taiwan, including military training there for nearly 30 years. Lee’s advice was simple: economic integration, not force, would bring the two sides closer.
He also served as interpreter between China and the West. When Jiang Zemin held his hand at dinner and asked, “Tell me, what does the West really think of us?”, Lee answered: “Really, they’re fearful of you once you get your act going.” At the same time, he told Western leaders that China’s growth was real and trying to contain it was a mistake.
Former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt said Lee inspired him to visit China over a dozen times. Harvard’s Graham Allison wrote that no one outside the US had greater influence on American policy toward a rising China than Lee.
Singapore’s bilingual policy helped too. When Hu Jintao sat next to PM Lee Hsien Loong at an APEC dinner and they spoke Mandarin, it created a connection that English-only diplomacy simply couldn’t.
So What’s Next?
The chapter ends with a question. Xi Jinping told Lee in 2008: “We will need you for a long time… We get more from you than from America.” But China is growing fast and learning from everyone now. Will Singapore stay relevant?
The authors think yes, as long as Singapore keeps doing what Lee did: blending Western practice with Asian values, staying useful as a gateway between China and the world. Lee’s personal touch is gone, but the institutional connections, the joint projects, and the trust he built remain.
Lee described Xi as someone with “iron in his soul,” comparing him to Nelson Mandela. Whether that comparison ages well is another question entirely. But the relationship Lee built between Singapore and China? That has held up remarkably well.
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