Singapore-China Relations: The Introduction That Sets Everything Up
The editors, Zheng Yongnian and Lye Liang Fook, start with something refreshingly honest. They admit the project scared them. World Scientific Publishing asked them to write a book commemorating 50 years of Singapore-China relations, and they thought: huge topic, not much time.
But they did it anyway. Instead of trying to cover everything, they picked four features that make Singapore-China relations stand out from China’s relationships with other countries.
Let me walk you through them.
Feature One: From Enemies to Partners
This is the big one. In the 1950s and 1960s, Singapore and China were on opposite sides. China supported communist movements across Southeast Asia, trying to destabilize newly independent governments. Singapore included. Chinese state media called Singapore “running dogs of the American imperialists.” Not exactly friendly.
But here’s the thing. Even during those rough years, Singapore never fully cut ties with China. Other Southeast Asian countries broke things off at various points. Singapore didn’t. It kept trade going. It kept the Bank of China branch open, even though Malaysia was pressuring them hard to close it.
That’s a very Singapore move. Pragmatic. Don’t burn bridges you might need later.
Fast forward to today, and the two countries cooperate on economics, education, culture, environment, tourism, you name it.
There’s an important point the editors make here. For a long time, some people in China saw Singapore as basically a Chinese society because of its ethnic Chinese majority. The implication: Singapore should naturally side with China. Singapore pushed back hard against this. It did not want its Southeast Asian neighbors to see it as a “third China.” Over time, China officially accepted that Singapore is its own sovereign nation. The editors say this shift was a big deal for the relationship to grow on healthy terms.
Feature Two: Deng Xiaoping and Lee Kuan Yew
The second feature is about two people who did more than anyone else to build this relationship: Deng Xiaoping and Lee Kuan Yew.
The groundwork started in the mid-1970s. Singapore’s Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam visited China in 1975. Lee Kuan Yew followed in 1976 as the first visit by a Singapore prime minister. Then in 1978, Deng visited Singapore and was genuinely impressed by how much the country had developed since independence in 1965.
Singapore’s leaders believed that what Deng saw helped push him toward China’s “open door” reform policy that same year. The two leaders kept meeting through the 1980s. Then in 1992, Deng did his famous Southern Tour, where he told Chinese provinces to catch up with the “four Asian dragons” (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan). He singled out Singapore for its social order and good governance.
That speech created what the book calls “Singapore fever” in China. Hundreds of Chinese delegations came to study Singapore that year alone. It also opened the door for the Suzhou Industrial Park, which became the first major joint project between the two countries.
When Lee Kuan Yew died in March 2015, the Chinese response showed how much he mattered. Xi Jinping called him “an old friend of the Chinese people” and “a founder, pioneer and impeller of China-Singapore relations.” Li Keqiang said Lee’s contributions “will surely be written into the annals of history.” Multiple senior officials sent separate condolence messages. That level of attention is not standard protocol.
Feature Three: Institutional Frameworks
Here’s where it gets less personal and more structural. The editors argue that Singapore and China have built an unusually dense network of institutional mechanisms for a relationship between a tiny country and a massive one.
The main one is the Joint Council for Bilateral Cooperation (JCBC), co-chaired by Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister and a member of China’s Political Bureau Standing Committee. That’s extremely high level. The JCBC oversees big projects like Suzhou Industrial Park and the Tianjin Eco-city. On top of that, Singapore has cooperation platforms with seven Chinese provinces at the ministerial level.
Why does this matter? Because leaders die. Deng and Lee built everything on personal trust. But you can’t run foreign policy on personal chemistry forever. These institutional mechanisms are how the relationship survives leadership transitions.
The editors also make an interesting comparison. Among the “newly industrialized economies,” Singapore’s relevance to China has actually grown over time. Hong Kong’s role as China’s gateway to the world faded as China opened up directly. Taiwan is politically off-limits as a “model” because China considers it a renegade province. So Singapore sits in a unique spot: a well-governed country that China can study and partner with without political baggage.
Feature Four: Big Joint Projects
The fourth feature is about concrete projects. Not just talk and handshakes, but actual things being built.
The two flagship government-to-government projects are the Suzhou Industrial Park (started 1994) and the Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-city (started 2008). Both are overseen by the JCBC. Both are commercially run to stay financially sustainable, even though governments are deeply involved in their direction.
Then there’s a second tier of projects led by the private sector with government support: the Guangzhou Knowledge City, the Jilin Food Zone, the Sichuan Hi-tech Innovation Park, the Nanjing Eco Hi-tech Island. PM Lee Hsien Loong praised this model in 2014, saying governments provide “training, advice, guidance” while the private sector drives things forward.
The editors are honest about the risks. When governments put their names on projects, they carry political risk. A successful project boosts the relationship. A failed one becomes a liability. That’s why both governments are careful about new flagships. When they discussed a possible third one, both sides set strict criteria: clear objectives, commercial viability, alignment with China’s priorities, full local government support. By 2015, a third flagship in western China was being explored, linked to China’s “One Belt One Road” initiative.
What Makes This Relationship Different
The editors wrap up by making a case for why Singapore-China relations are genuinely special. Many countries share some of these features with China. Very few share all four: the shift from confrontation to cooperation, the personal foundations laid by Deng and Lee, the dense institutional mechanisms, and the concrete joint projects.
What makes it even more remarkable is that Singapore is small and has a Chinese ethnic majority. Both factors should work against it. A big country can push a small one around. An ethnic connection creates awkward expectations. The fact that these haven’t derailed the relationship is, as the editors put it, “a big achievement.”
The Rest of the Book
The introduction previews all 11 chapters covering trade, tourism, the Suzhou and Tianjin projects in detail, private sector ventures, education, the Chinese community in Singapore, media portrayals, and Chinese studies as an academic discipline.
One detail I found interesting: the “50 Years” in the title doesn’t mean 50 years of diplomatic ties (those only started in 1990). It goes back to Singapore’s independence in 1965. And the editors note that exchanges go even further back, before the People’s Republic was founded in 1949. The 50 years is more of a framing device than a strict timeline.
The introduction does its job well. Four features, laid out clearly, with enough context to see why they matter. A practical, structured way to think about a relationship that most people outside the region don’t pay enough attention to.
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